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reedom, wherever it existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially 
limited. This is especially clear for the greatest and most elementary of all 
negative liberties, the freedom of movement; the borders of national territory or 
the walls of the city-state comprehended and protected a space in which man could 
move freely. Treaties of international guarantees provide an e xtension of this 
territorially bound freedom for citizens outside their own country, but even under 
these modern conditions the elementary coincidence of freedom and a limited space 
remains manifest. What is true for freedom of movement is to a large exten t, valid for 
freedom in general. Freedom in a positive sense is possible only among equals, and 
equality itself is by no means a universally valid principle but, again, applicable only 
with limitations and even within spatial limits. 
 
 
Hannah Arendt (1963), On Revolution. 
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ABSTRACT 
This report carries out an assessment of the European measures and practices implemented within the 
scope of the Schengen  borders regime after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in  the United 
States. In particular we look at: 
•  the re-introduction of border checks on the basis of Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention, along 
with the plan to put protestors under surveillance and deny entry to suspected troublemakers; and 
•  the policies on intrusive surveillance  through the use of biometric technologies and databases, as 
well as the controversial EU /US bilateral relations on  the transfer of Passenger Name Record 
information (PNR). 
We also evaluate to what extent security has  taken precedence in the European agenda  and how it 
undermines, among others, the fundamental right of free movement of persons within the EU (which is 
enshrined in the EC Treaty), and leads to a quasi-permanent ‘state of exception’ or ‘emergency’ within 
the European borders. The human rights considerations as well as the  main human targets of these 
security policies also need special scrutiny. 
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1.  Application by the  member states of Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention: 
  Overusing an exceptional clause? 
The current illusory change in security concepts as well as in the classical  distinction between internal 
and external security, owing to the often politically claimed globalisation of its nature, has led towards 
justifications across Europe for a si gnificant increase in  state (mal)practices on intrusive surveillance, 
policing and restrictive measures towards people in general . This change may have  resulted, in some 
instances, in  the erosion of civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. Therefore the practices 
implementing the Schengen borders regime merit special attention.  
The Schengen agreement of 1985
1 and  the Convention of 1990
2 that implemented it were intended to 
establish, through an intergovernmental  approach,
3 the application of  ‘the principle of the free 
movement of persons’ within the European borders.
4  
The Single European Act, which  came into  effect on 1 July 1987 by introducing Art. 14 into the EC 
Treaties (formerly Art. 8a), stipulated that the European Community should adopt measures aimed at 
achieving ‘a market without frontiers’, i.e. an internal market.
 Article 14 point 2 states :  
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty. 
Thus, an internal market should consist of an area without qualitative or quantitative barriers in which 
the free movement of persons, among  the other three freedoms of movement, should be ensured and 
fully respected under certain circumstances.
5  
It is also  important to recall that it was not until 1 May 1999, when the Amsterdam Treaty came into 
effect, that Schengen became part of the EU machinery,
6 and the section dealing with the Schengen 
                                                   
1 The original Schengen Agreement was signed on 14 June 1985 by Germany, France and the Benelux countries ; 
in the meantime, the Commission presented a White Paper to the European Council on completing the internal 
market, COM(1985) 310 final, Brussels, 14 June 1985. 
2 Nevertheless the Convention, composed of 142 articles and seven titles, was not applied by any of the member 
states until, after numerous delays, 1995, even though it entered into force in 1993.  
3 See Bigo, D. (1996), who explains the main reasons why the intergovernmental method was chosen.  
4 See Handol, J. (1995); see also Van Houtum, H. (2000). 
5 The first concept used by the original treaty was the one of  the  common market ; see also Art. 3 of the EC 
Treaty, which provides: “For the purposes set out in Art. 2, the activities of the Community shall include…(c) an 
internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital”. See also Graig, P. and G. de B urce (1998).  
6 Schengen entered into force on 26 March 1995 and until 1 May 1999, it remained within intergovernmental 
competence, with only a limited number of the EU member states participating fully.  APAP & CARRERA 
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borders acquis  was incorporated within the first pillar.
7 A Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty 
finally  integrated the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU  – including the decisions and 
declarations adopted by the Executive Committee established by the 1990 Convention. 
Looking at the implementation by member states of some of the measures adopted under the Schengen 
regime,
8 however, a different path has been taken from the one carefully settled in the EU Treaty 
structure,
9 due to the predominance of the security  rationale  over the one of freedom.
10 We can see 
how, in some instances member states have unilaterally reintroduced border controls and checks o n 
individuals, justified on grounds of ‘special security concerns’ or a ‘state of emergency’. Thus not only 
has  one of the main goals of the internal market been undermined  – the freedom of movement of 
persons – but also other fundamental rights and freedoms provided at the  European as well as at 
international level.  Additionally,  the categories of people affected by these restrictive policies 
introduced on behalf of ‘our security’ cover not only those who qualify as third-country nationals 
(TCNs) or ‘others’,
11 but also EU citizens in general.  
The  provision  used by the member states has particularly  been  Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention, 
which has Arts. 62.1 and 64 of the EC Treaty
12 as its legal basis and provides the following:  
1.  Internal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out. 
2.  Nevertheless, where public policy or national security so require, a Contracting Party may, after 
consulting the other Contracting Parties, decide that for a limited period national border checks 
appropriate to the situation shall be carried out at internal borders. If public policy or national 
security requires immediate action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary 
measures and at the earliest opportunity shall inform the other Contracting Parties thereof. 
Therefore this article states in its first paragraph that no checks o n persons shall be carried out when 
crossing internal borders, but allows in its second paragraph for the unilateral  introduction of border 
controls at internal borders “where public policy  or national security so require” after consulting the 
other Schengen contracting parties. The  consultation requirement does not have to  be followed in 
those instances when the  state deems it necessary to act immediately: the state may reinstate checks 
                                                   
7  Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, however, were integrated into the third pillar; see Art. 2 of 
the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.  
8 Since 1990, all the EU member  states have acceded to the Schengen regime, except for the UK and Ireland, 
which together with Denmark, concluded special protocols that permit them to  remain outside the  Schengen 
agreement in relation to the special provisions. That notwithstanding, the UK and Ireland are allowed to choose 
whether they wish to participate in some of the provisions adopted under the regime, following Arts. 3 and 4 of 
the Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. In addition, the European Commission has 
started negotiations with Switzerland regarding their potential future association with the Schengen regime (see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/switzerland/intro/). 
9 Art. 2 of the TEU states: “The Union shall set itself the following objectives: to maintain and develop the union 
as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and 
combating of crime”. 
10 It is also interesting to note that the French controls at its borders with the Benelux countries have not yet been 
totally abolished. 
11 Following the opinion of some academics, these ‘other’ persons would be those who fall into the category of 
foreigners and would  also fulfill certain physical as well as behavioral characteristics that are different from the 
‘occidental-normal’ ones.  
12 Looking at the Council Decision that determines the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions  that 
constitute the Schengen acquis and statements (1999/436/EC, 20 May 1999), the EU legal basis for Art. 2.2 of 
the Schengen Convention is Art. 62.1, with  respect to the provisions of Art. 64 of the  EC Treaty; Art. 62.1 
stipulates the absence of any controls for crossing internal borders, with resp ect to Art. 64, which states that this 
“should not affect the exercise by the Member States of their responsibilities for the maintenance of law and 
order”.  MAINTAINING SECURITY WITHIN BORDERS 
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when an ‘extreme urgency’ exists.
13 Even though this provision must be  used  exclusively under the 
exceptional circumstances of an  emergency  and for a limited period of time, looking at the states’ 
practices, however, their use of the provision has not been  so exceptional, but rather  a  common 
practice.  
Critical questions have been raised concerning the continued non-communitarisation of Art. 2.2, which 
falls completely outside the EU  institutional framework.
14 The fact that this provision is still of  a 
purely intergovernmental nature explains the  lack of judicial and parliamentary  accountability for the 
use of this clause  so far. In most of the cases, public  information  is lacking on when and how the 
states’ authorities  have  implemented  it.  In fact, l ooking at  the public server of the  EU  Council, 
available information about every single  application of the exceptional clause seems to be  less than 
exhaustive.
15  Another problem is the  lack of  checks  and balances for the  proportionality of the 
temporarily resettled border controls, and how to protect the respect of human rights, civil liberties and 
the rule of law. The full application of the right of free movement of persons provided by Art. 18 of 
the TEC
16 and  Art. 45
17 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as the respect of Art. 
15 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) need to be guaranteed and considered as a 
high policy priority.
18 
In addition, it is significant to see how “these checks are applied flexibly as the situation requires”.
19 
The  law enforcement authorities at the  national level have wide discretion to determine the existence 
of a threat to public policy and national security, and the security standards to follow in the particular 
event. Table  1 shows the use that some of the contracting states have made of Art. 2.2, as well as the 
concrete events and period of time in which it has been implemented.  
A good example of the often-unilateral use of Art. 2.2 was that by Italy on the occasion of the G8 
meeting in Genoa between 20 and 22 July 2001.
20 As the Interior Minister Claudio Scajola said before 
the Chamber of Deputies, due to the use of this article and the exercise of border controls, 2,093 
persons were refused entry into the country.
21 
                                                   
13 See the decision of the Schengen Executive Committee of 20 December 1995 on the procedure for applying 
Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (SCH/Comex (95) 20 rev. 2), OJ 
L239, 22 September 2000, p. 16. It states: “A State which deems it necessary to reinstate checks immediately so 
as to maintain public order or national security must send notification to the other States containing the elements 
listed under point 1, i.e. grounds, extent and probable duration of the measure”.  
14 The Commission has referred to a legislative proposal harmonising the procedure to use Art. 2.2 several times, 
however, a more formal or serious proposal is lacking so far.  
15 See http://register.consilium.eu.int/utfregister/frames/introfsEN.htm. 
16 Art. 18.1 of the EC Treaty, states: “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and 
by the measures adopted to give it effect ”. 
17 Art. 45 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms states: “Every citizen of the Union has 
the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”. 
18 Art. 15 of the ECHR, entitled “Derogation in time of emergency”, stipulates: “In time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”. See Ergec, R. (1987); see 
also Steiner, H. J. and P. Alston (2000). 
19 See the application by Spain of Art. 2.2 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Council of 
the European Union,  15901/02, Brussels, 20 December 2002; see also  Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention, 
which states that “checks appropriate to the situation shall be carried out”. 
20 See the application by Italy of Art. 2.2 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Council of 
the European Union, 10830/01, Brussels, 11 November 2001.  
21  See  http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/jul/genoa6.htm; s ee also the report on the International Inquiry 
Committee for the  protection of basic human rights in the face of globalization, 6 April 2002  (retrieved from  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jul/08agenoa1.htm).  APAP & CARRERA 
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Table 1. Use of Art. 2.2 per country and event  
COUNTRY  EVENT  PERIOD OF TIME 
Belgium  Immigrant regularisation 
programme  10–31 January 2000 
Luxembourg   Belgian restoration of border checks  Not specified 
Germany   Visit of the Iranian President 
Mohammad Khatami  7–12 July 2000 
France 
European Council meeting in 
Biarritz, France, 
12–14 October 2000 
10–14 October 2000 
Spain 
European Council meeting held in 
Biarritz, France,  
12–14 October 2000 
11–14 October 2000 
Luxembourg 
Visit of Prime Minister Jose Maria 
Aznar from Spain, 28–29 
November 2000 
25–29 November 2000 
France   Nice European Council, 7–8 
December 2000 
2–10 December 2000 
Belgium 
Risk of sudden, temporary increase 
in asylum-seekers owing to new 
asylum restrictions from 10 January 
2001 
26 December 2000 to  10 
January 2001 
Austria 
European Economic Summit, 
Salzburg,  
1–3 July 2001 
25 June to 3 July 2001 
Sweden   European Summit Gothenburg,  
15–16 June 2001 
15–16 June 2001 
Italy 
G8 meeting, Genoa, 
20–22 July 2001 
14–21 July 2001 
Norway  
Nobel prize ceremony, including 
Palestinian leader Yassar Arafat and 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Oslo 
5–12 December 2001 
Spain   Events scheduled by the Spanish 
presidency 
30 January to  4 February 
2002 
Iceland 
Checks among passengers on two 
planes from Copenhagen for 
members of a suspected organi sed 
crime group 
1 February 2002 
Austria  
Visit of the Iranian President 
Mohammad Khatami, 11–13 march 
2002 
11–13 March 2002 
Spain   Barcelona European Council 
meeting  9–18 March 2002 
Spain   Informal meeting of EU defence 
ministers, Zaragoza  21–23 March 2002 MAINTAINING SECURITY WITHIN BORDERS 
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Iceland  NATO meeting in Reykjavic, 14–5 
May 2002 
7–16 May 2002 
Spain   EU Summit in Seville, 21–22 June 
2002  14–22 June 2002 
Norway  World Bank Conference, Oslo, 24–
26 June 2002  15–27 June 2002 
Austria   European Economic Summit, 15-17 
September 2002  9–17 September 2002 
France  Batasuna meeting/rally, Bayonne 
(Pyrenees) 
19 October 2002 
Italy  European Social Forum, Florence  1–10 November 2002 
Denmark  Copenhagen European Council, 12–
13 December 2002  6–12 December 2002 
Sweden   Copenhagen European Council, 12–
13 December 2002  6–14 December 2002 
Spain  
Movement of eminent persons 
during the Christmas holidays to the 
area of the Arán Valley (Lleida)  
20 December 2002 to  7 
January 2003 
Source: Statewatch European Monitor (Vol. 3, No. 4, February 2003).  
Indeed, according to NGOs and human rights organisations reporting directly from Genoa,
22 a high 
number of persons were not checked at the border points on a  case-by-case basis, as required by the 
Schengen acquis , but instead were blocked as a group at the Italian frontiers. Additionally, the security 
framework and police force action used during the event have been identified as failing to meet the 
principle of proportionality and represented a good example of what a ‘police state’ may look like.
23  
Spain is another case that shows the wide discretion  often  left in the hands of the states’ institutions. 
Looking back, the Spanish national  authorities have used the exceptional clause more than any other 
Schengen  state so far. Measures on border controls were  (re)introduced not only  during the Spanish 
presidency of the EU (at the Council meetings in Seville and Barcelona), but also in situations when 
the grounds for emergency were not clear in order to  apply the ‘exceptional’ article.  This wa s also the 
case in the movement of eminent persons to the Arán Valley during the Christmas holidays.
24  
One of the main  negative aspects of the application  of Art. 2.2 is that once the border controls have 
been  re-established all those entering the country will be  exhaustively checked. This may lead to a 
total block of the border due to the usually large-scale influx of travellers and the necessity to check a 
majority or all of them. Therefore, the restrictive  measures will affect not only those who qualify as  
‘suspects’, but also any person trying to cross the frontier of that state for whatever reason.
25 Article 1 
states: “Any Member State which applies Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention shall take every step to 
limit, as far as possible, the inconvenience caused by checks on travellers”, but in our opinion, whether 
the instruments adopted to achieve this goal will be effective in practice remains highly uncertain.  
                                                   
22  See, among others,  Italy, G8 Genoa policing operation of July 2001, A summary of concerns,  Amnesty 
International, London, 1 November 2001 (retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org).  
23 See “Italy’s strategy of tension”, The Guardian,  27 July 2001; see also  the statements by two of the British 
people arrested in http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/aug/02genoa.htm. 
24 See the application by Spain of Art. 2.2 of the Convention implementing the Schengen agreement, Council of 
the European Union, 15901/02, Brussels, 20 December 2002.  
25 In this last case, the freedom to provide services  – as provided by Arts. 49-55 of the EC Treaty and the Council 
Directive 73/148 of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to  the establishment and the provision of services, 
OJ(1973) L172/14 – would be gravely undermined.  APAP & CARRERA 
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Protests and demonstrations on relevant occasions  such  as European Council meetings and other 
comparable events have  become  one of the main targeted activities when  Art. 2.2 h as been more 
frequently applied by the member states. The huge demonstrations that occurred during the EU-US 
summit in Gothenburg represented the starting point for the development of an EU policy dealing with 
these matters.
26 Consequently, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council meeting of July 2001 dealt 
for the first time with the operational measures necessary to reduce the risk of serious disturbances of 
law and order, including the need to develop the collection, analysis and exchange of data between the 
competent national authorities.
27 Recently, an action plan has been presented by the Italian  presidency 
of the EU to put protestors or ‘suspected troublemakers’ or both under surveillance.
28 
The main idea of the draft Council Resolution on security at European Council meetings and other 
comparable events
29 is the denial of entry to  those falling within the  previously  mentioned categories 
to the territory of the state. Thus, it is equally a denial of their ability to exercise their free movement 
rights, where a protest is planned, by  determining that they will constitute  potential disturbances of 
public law and order.  
Looking at the provisions of the  draft Council Resolution,
30 this proposal is intended to lead to the 
creation of  a system of  national databases  of persons who  have been  identified as  potential 
‘troublemakers’ or ‘suspects’. These databases will enable the  transfer of data  between the different 
national authorities. In our view, it is striking to see how the inclusion of a suspect in such a database 
and the  exchange of all data concerning a particular person  may be based exclusively o n suspicions  
that if this person crosses the border, he or she may be a  serious threat to the internal security of the 
state. No clear legal standards are provided for carrying out the surveillance of these targeted groups.  
Therefore, it is highly probable that the respect of the rights to peaceful assembly and  demonstration 
and freedom of expression, provided by Arts. 10
31 and 11  of the ECHR,
32 as well as the right of data 
protection o f the  ‘not-welcomed’  may  be  jeopardised by the application and functioning of the 
proposed European system. Furthermore, Art. 2 of the draft Resolution stipulates:  
Any Member State which applies Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention when a European 
Council meeting or other comparable international event is being held within its territory 
will therefore have to give precedence to targeted close checks on individuals believed to 
be intending to enter the country with the aim of disrupting public order and security at 
the event.  
We share the view  that the expression “individuals believed to be intending” shows the lack of real or 
feasible conviction that the national law enforcement authorities may succeed in determining whether 
or not the person concerned  truly  represents a threat to public order and national  security to the state 
holding the high-level event.  
                                                   
26 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1384339.stm; see also 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133085.htm for all the legislative developments concerning the 
prevention and control of hooliganism.  
27 See the Conclusions adopted by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
on 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and other comparable events, Council of the 
European Union, 10916/01 JAI 82, Brussels, 16 July 2001. 
28 See http://www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Notizie/affariGeneraliRelazioniEsterne/. 
29 See the Draft Council Resolution on security at European Council meetings and other comparable events, 
Council of the European Union, 10965/03, Brussels, 30 June 2003. 
30 The proposal by the Italian presidency has received  criticism from, for instance,  the Dutch government (see 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/aug/20neths.htm). 
31  Art. 1 0 of the ECHR,  entitled  “Freedom of expression”, provides: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 
32  Art. 11 of the ECHR on the freedom of assembly and association stipulates: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests”. MAINTAINING SECURITY WITHIN BORDERS 
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The creation of a system to transfer personal data between the  member states is covered by Art. 3 of 
the  draft  Council Resolution.
33  This  system  would  be  an extension of the  existing  Schengen 
Information System  (SIS). It would incorporate to the latter a  European database on  ‘suspected 
protestors’.  It is also  interesting to highlight that Art. 4  of the proposal  states that the “information 
supplied may, where national legislation allows, include names of individuals convicted of offences 
involving disruption of public order at demonstration or other events”. The real scope and limits of the 
behaviours and activities that may fall  within the expression  “or other events”, as well as the control 
and l imits over the use of the  special  information provided remains rather far from the concept of 
European accountability.  
Finally, the legal tool that has been used to deal with the policy issue  is a draft Council  Resolution. 
This sort of legal act is not subject to any kind of parliamentary  or judicial control whatsoever. Also, a 
resolution  falls within the category of  the so-called  ‘soft law’, which refers to the  non-binding 
character of certain  EU  decisions, and thus the  member states will be completely  free to apply or not 
apply its provisions in their internal systems.  
Closely  related  and complementary  to  the  draft  Council  Resolution  on security  is  the  Security 
Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the 
European Council.
34 Its main purpose is presented in the introductory chapter of the document, which 
states that its intention is as follows: 
to serve as a practical instrument or check-list providing guidelines and inspiration for 
law enforcement authorities in Europe undertaking the responsibility for security at 
international events such as meetings of the European Council or providing assistance for 
the host authorities.  
Point IV.2  of the document provides that the  member  states shall use  Art. 2.2 of the Schengen 
Convention as “the available and appropriate” legal base to justify the border checks and the potential 
intensification of police control aimed at preventing the ‘not-welcomed’ from going to the part of the 
territory where the event is going to take place. 
The handbook gives a predominant role to the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) by stating the 
set of responsibilities that it has in the procedure, such  as giving advice about the security measure to 
be implemented before the event takes place, as well as maintaining liaison with the  event security 
officer of the organising state. In our view, however, the text leaves the national security authorities of 
the hosting state too much room for discretion regarding the decisions about the security framework to 
adopt and the grounds for determining a potential threat to the maintenance of public law and order.  
This  may  be  shown  in the so-called ‘permanent risk analysis’ that has to be carried out by each 
permanent national contact following the steps set out in Annex A of the handbook,  entitled “Risk 
analysis on potential demonstrators and other groupings”. The risk analysis, which has to be developed 
by the state  in order to gather information on suspected troublemakers, is again too wide in character, 
and based on unilateral and purely subjective considerations. 
2.  Towards a coherent EU policy ensuring the right of data protection? 
This  section  builds  on the previous one  by  briefly  analysing  other Schengen-related  policies,
35 
including those that fall within the package of measures called for by modern political voices that see 
an urgent need for more security guarantees surrounding our borders.
36  
                                                   
33 See paragraph 3 of the  draft Resolution, which states: “In order to make it easier for the host country to carry 
out targeted close checks on travelers, Member States shall supply that country with any information of 
relevance in identifying individuals with a record of having caused disturbances in similar circumstances”. 
34  See the  Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as 
meetings of the European Council, Council of the European Union, 12637/3/02 ENFOPOL 123 REV 2 + COR 
1, Brussels, 12 November 2002; see also the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 December 1998 on the 
Handbook on cross-border police cooperation (SCH/Comex (98) 52).  
35 See Apap (2002), pp. 72-82. APAP & CARRERA 
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The  future  developments of a Visa Information System (VIS) and the second generation of the 
Schengen  Information  System (SIS II),
37 as well as the use of biometrics and new technologies of 
surveillance, are at present a hot topic for discussion at the  European  level. Different opinions arise 
about the coherency of these policies  with  European and international  human rights standards in 
general, and  the respect of data protection rights for EU  and non-EU citizens in particular.
38 Indeed, 
the development of these controversial policies will be relevant not o nly to those falling within the 
category of ‘the others’, foreigners or TCNs, but also to every single  individual fulfilling the necessary 
conditions – being physiological or behavioural  or both - to be qualified as an ‘unwanted’, ‘not-
welcomed’ or ‘suspicious’ person. The question of whether these instruments (which are justified on 
grounds of the now familiar American/European campaign  on the war against terror and the fight 
against illegal immigration) may lead to practices that are not reconciled with respect for human rights 
remains open. 
As a point of departure, it is interesting to  assess the  Commission’s recent Communication on the 
development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, 
external borders and the return of illegal residents, COM(2003) 323 final .
39 In this key legislative 
proposal, the European Commission, after having carried out the feasibility study on the necessary 
investment costs,
40 reconfirmed the high priority already given  at the European Councils of Laeken
41 
and Seville
42 to the development of, among others, the following policy guidelines and objectives :  
1.  the Visa Information System (VIS), as a future tool that would become a pivotal part of the 
plan to combat illegal immigration  and  the trafficking/smuggling of human beings,
43 and 
complement the SIS II; and 
2.  biometric identifiers technology for the overall efficiency and accuracy of the  projected 
system. 
The  communication also underlined the progressive, global importance given to “the verification and 
identification of travellers and the vulnerability of current travel documents”, in order to prevent a 
potential threat to aviation. It also stressed the necessity of amending the existing EC regulations that 
                                                                                                                                                             
36 See A secure Europe in a better world, the paper presented by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy at the European Council in Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003; the paper explains 
in a rather unfortunate way that Europe faces three threats: international terrorism (Europe is both a target and a 
base for terrorists), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organised crime.  
37 With regard to the Schengen Information System, see Guild, E. (2001). 
38 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/index_en.htm. 
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council in view of the European 
Council of Thessaloniki, Brussels, 3 June 2003, COM(2003) 323 final.  
40 Around €140 million have been deemed necessary.  
41 Point 42 of the Laeken Presidency Conclusions, 14–15 December 2001 states: “Better management of the 
Union's external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the 
traffic in human beings. The European Council asks the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements 
for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in which 
a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be created. It asks the Council and the 
Member States to take steps to set up a common visa identification system and to examine the possibility of 
setting up common consular offices.” 
42 Point 30 of the Seville Presidency Conclusions, 21 and 22 June 2002 provides for the “introduction, as soon as 
possible, of a common identification system for visa data, in the light of a feasibility study to be submitted in 
March 2003 and on the basis of guidelines from the Council”. 
43 See the  Proposal for a  comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in 
the European Union, 2002/C 142/02, 14 June  2002, pp. 26 and 27; see also  the  Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,  Towards integrated management of the external 
borders of the Member States of the European Union, COM(2002) 233 final, Brussels, 7 May 2002, in which the 
proposal towards the creation of a European Corps of Border Guards was also presented; on that subject, see also 
the UK Parliament House of Lords Select Committee Session 2002–2003, Proposals for a European Border 
Guard, 29
th Report, 1 July 2003.  MAINTAINING SECURITY WITHIN BORDERS 
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deal with the uniform format for visas and residence permits for TCNs in order “to establish a reliable 
link between the document issued and its holder”.
44 Therefore, following these policy guidelines, the 
Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions called for the establishment of “ a coherent approach on 
biometric identifiers or biometric data, which would result in harmonised solutions for documents for 
third country nationals, EU citizens’ passports and information systems (VIS and SIS II)”.
45 
The European Council  thus  formally  invited the Commission to prepare the  legislative  proposals 
necessary to comply with the agreed political  agenda, influenced to a great extent by  transatlantic 
politics and pressures. Consequently, two proposals have been recently presented  by the European 
Commission
46 that intend to amend: 
•  the Council Regulation laying down a uniform format for residence permits of third-country 
nationals, (EC) No. 1030/2002, of 13 June 2002; and 
•  the Council Regulation laying down  a uniform format for visas, (EC) No. 1683/95, of 29 May 
1995.  
The two Commission proposals will result in the harmonisation of documents granted to TCNs within 
the EU, by stipulating a common set of legal bases and leaving to the competent national authorities 
the responsibility  for the practical  implementation of the system.  The main objective of these 
amendments is once again justified on behalf of the necessity to guarantee a very high level of security 
in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001.
47 The member states will be required to 
introduce biometric information in visas as well as residence permits given to  the target group, i.e. 
TCNs.  
Even though the concept of biometric data may be rather broad and flexible  for any sort of 
technological preferences, these data can  be defined as  information  on  the  behavioural and 
physiological characteristics of an individual (retina scans, facial recognition and digital fingerprints, 
among others) that will facilitate his or her automatic identification.
48  
In addition, as the Council also stressed in Thessaloniki, the use of biometric identifiers will play a 
decisive role in the future development of the VIS
49 as well as the  upcoming second generation of the 
SIS (SIS II),
50 which will  lead to the establishment of a European database on inadmissible foreigners. 
Furthermore, it is striking to see how, following some studies carried out by NGOs,
51 the human 
targets of these policy initiatives and databases will not only  be ‘foreigners’, but a broader category of 
                                                   
44 See page 5 of the Commission Communication, COM(2003) 323 final, within the second heading on  Policy 
Developments.  
45 See page 3 of the Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, 19-20 June 2003.  
46 See the Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation, (EC) 1030/2002,  Laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals, COM(2003) 0558 final–CNS 2003/0218, and also the 
Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation, (EC) 1683/95, Laying down a uniform format for visas, 
COM(2003) 0558 final–CNS 2003/0217, 24 September 2003.  
47 See the Explanatory Memorandum of both proposals, where it is first stated that, “In the aftermath of the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001 the Commission was asked by Member States to take immediate action in order to 
improve document security. Clearly, it was important to be able to detect persons who tried to use forged official 
documents in order to gain entry to European Union territory. Prevention of the use of bogus or false identities 
could best be achieved by enabling more reliable checking of whether the person who presented a document was 
identical to the person to whom the document has been issued.” 
48 Spain was one of the first EU countries that used biometrics identifiers (fingerprints) in the issue of national 
identity cards and other identity documents.  
49 The VIS  is thought to  have  been structured in two parts, a central visa information system (C-VIS), and a 
national visa information system in each of the member states (N-VIS). 
50 See the JUSTICE press release of 18 December 2000, “Europe’s largest database breaches human rights 
standards”, in which the SIS was criticised for not fulfilling the requirements for data protection; see also the 
Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament,  Development of the Schengen 
Information System II, COM(2001) 0720 final.  
51 Apap, J. (2000),  A Report on Free Movement of People in the Schengen Area: Visible and Hidden Barriers, 
Euro Citizen Action Service (ECAS), Brussels.  APAP & CARRERA 
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persons. In fact, as the SIS stands now, the following may  also  qualify to be recorded in the SIS 
database:  
•  wanted persons or persons under police surveillance; 
•  missing persons or persons who should be placed under protection (such as minors); and 
•  persons whose identity is (or maybe) fraudulently used as an alias by others (such  as in reported 
cases of stolen identity documents). 
In our opinion, it is worrying to see the lack of transparency about the real limits and purposes of these 
new databases, which  sometimes include sensitive data about those persons who  may also fulfil the 
requirements to be noted on the  SIS. It is also striking  to look at the  current politically-desired 
functions
52 of  such systems, and  the  wider competences given to the  national  security  authorities 
(police, military and border guards) for access to data collected through  these  new technological 
instruments, despite not being fully in accordance with Art. 96 of the Schengen Convention.
53  
Democratic controls, along with parliamentary and judicial accountability are preconditions to comply 
with the rule of law and  to ensure the  human rights protection. The right to data protection will 
continue to be  difficult to develop because of the abstract position of the SIS between the  first and 
third pillar. 
The Commission’s Communication  COM(2003)  323 final  also highlighted the importance of “the 
verification and identification of travellers and the vulnerability of current travel documents”. In that 
regard, on 13 March 2003 the European Parliament widely adopted a resolution regretting the joint 
declaration by US and EU officials of 19 February 2003, which allowed European airlines to transfer 
data  to US customs officials  on passengers flying to the US.
54 In the opinion of the European 
Parliament, this would infringe the European Directive  on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 95/46/EC, of 24 October 
1995.
55 Furthermore, the European Parliament was not informed at all during the whole process of the 
talks with US officials. Therefore, it called upon  the Commission to suspend this joint declaration as 
soon as possible, and instead implement a coherent EU policy on the use of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data for transport and border purposes, which would fully respect the human rights framework 
under EU law.  
Recently, through a  letter to the US Secretary of Homeland Security  on 12 June 2003,
56 Mr Frits 
Bolkestein, M ember of the European Commission in charge of the Internal Market and Taxation, 
expressed the difficulties that European airlines face in order to comply with the US requirements on 
PNR data, (which are justified on the grounds of preventing any threat to aviation). He also underlined 
the  high  degree of  uncertainty  about whether  the US framework meets the European  legal 
requirements for  the  adequate  protection of  human rights, particularly  Art. 15 of the European 
                                                   
52 See “Requirements for SIS”, Council of the European Union, 5968/02, SIS 6 , COMIX 78,  Brussels, 5 
February 2002; s ee also  the  Statewatch online news article  “SIS II takes ominous shape” (retrieved from  
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/apr/01sis.htm). 
53 Art. 96 of the Schengen Convention states: “Data on aliens for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes 
of refusing entry shall be entered on the basis of national alert resulting from decisions taken by the competent 
administrative authorities or courts in accordance with the rules of procedure laid down by national law”. The 
competent administrative authorities are not the security agencies of the member states, but instead the national 
immigration administrative institutions.  
54 Senior officials of the European Commission and the US Administration met in Brussels on 17–18 February 
2003, to find a solution to the problems for airlines flying to or from the US, owing to the new Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) transmission requirements in the US Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001.  
55 Official Journal (1995), OJ L281, 23 November, see Chapter IV, which deals with Transfer of Personal Data 
to Third Countries, and specifically Art. 25; see also the Report from the Commission (2003), First Report on the 
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, COM (2003), 265 final, 15 May.  
56 See the letter  from  Frits Bolkestein, Member of the European Commission in charge of the Internal Market 
and Taxation, to US Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, 12 June 2003; see also the speech by Frits 
Bolkestein, “EU/US talks on transfers of airline passengers”, Brussels, 9 September 2003.  MAINTAINING SECURITY WITHIN BORDERS 
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Directive on Data Protection,
57 as well as Art. 8 of the  EU  Charter of Fundamental Rights.
58 H e 
continued by explaining that, 
Data protection authorities here take the view that PNR data is flowing to the US in 
breach of our Data Protection Directive…[C]ertain categories of data must receive 
reinforced protection under our law. Some such data may be included in certain PNR’s, 
for example data that may reveal religion or health condition. 
Indeed, there are  several sensitive concerns in relation to  the transfer of the sort of data that the US 
authorities have requested from the EU.
59 The most relevant of these concerns is the potential abuse, or 
rather non-proportional use, of ‘sensitive’ information, justified exclusively on the suspicions that a 
person fulfils (in our opinion) certain characteristics that are very well-defined and relate to a specific 
category of persons or ‘others’ who may represent a threat to aviation and global security in general. 
Use of information in such a manner goes directly against European data-protection rules. 
Whether it would be possible to find a legally secure and adequate  solution to deal with the issue at 
stake in the still-pending bilateral talks between the EU and the US, is in our view, far from being 
clear.
60 European authorities should  always keep in mind that every single security measure  needs to 
respect and meet the well-known, but often forgotten, human rights standards.  
Finally, we can conclude by remembering what the  Data Protection Working Party has stated in Art. 
29, in relation to the issue of biometric data:
61  
[T]he  processing of biometric data may only be considered lawful if all the procedures 
involved are carried out in respect of the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC.  
3.  Conclusion 
The  current  European political will  that is driving  towards rapid progress on  instruments  that 
implement  databases  on protestors and  foreigners, as well as  the development of  biometric 
technologies  to ensure a high level of security  against terrorism, organi sed  crime and illegal 
immigration, needs to be carefully assessed from a human rights and civil liberties perspective. 
The respect of the  fundamental rights and freedoms of  every human being, as provided by 
international as well as European legal frameworks, needs to be taken as a point of departure in every 
single security initiative adopted and implemented on behalf of our ‘security’. Security needs to go 
hand-to-hand with freedom. The political view advocating the establishment of an international order, 
based on effective multilateralism has to be assessed from a perspective  that maintains the  right 
                                                   
57 Art. 15 of the Council Directive, entitled “Automated individual decisions”, states: “Member States shall grant 
the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or 
significantly affects him and which is based solely in  [the]  automated processing of data intended to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work”. See also the recent judgment by the 
European Court of Justice of 20 May 2003, Joint Affairs C–465/00, C–138/01 and C–139/01.  
58 Art. 8 provides for the protection of personal data, stipulating that: 1) everyone has the right to the protection 
of personal data concerning him or her; 2) such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law ; 3) everyone has 
the right of access to the  data that has been collected concerning him or her and the right to have it rectified; and 
4) compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
59  See Apap, J., D. Bigo and  J.  Lodge (2003),  Data Protection in JHA: An Opportunity for Transatlantic 
Dialogue,  CEPS Commentary, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels,  July (retrieved from 
http://www.ceps.be/Commentary/July03/ApapBigoLodge.php). 
60 On 22  September  2003,  Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security,  US 
Department of Homeland Security, was in Brussels for the continuation of talks with EU officials on homeland 
security issues, including the transfer of PNR (retrieved from 
http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/Sept2303HutchinsonPNR.html );  see  also  the draft agreements 
between the EU and US  on extradition and on mutual legal assistance by the Council of the European Union 
(2003), 8295/03, Brussels, 9 April.  
61 See the  Working Document of biometrics,  Art. 29, Data Protection Working Party (the independent EU 
Advisory Body on Data Protection and Privacy), adopted 1 August 2003, 12168/02/EN, WP 80.  APAP & CARRERA 
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balance between freedom and  security. B oth of these are fundamental elements vis-à-vis the Justice 
and Home Affairs heading and the aim to create an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU, 
as highlighted at the Tampere European Council. 
The Schengen regime is not transparent enough and there are differences between the actual spirit of 
the Schengen acquis and how it is implemented in different member states. As identified in this report, 
there are still important gaps in some  of its current and projected  operational aspects that may be 
worrying  in view of  the upcoming  EU enlargement.
62  The  overuse of the formerly considered 
‘exceptional’ or ‘emergency’ clauses by the  member states to politically justify and  guarantee a high 
level of security and protection may lead to  cases in which some serious, practical  human rights 
considerations arise.
63 A  serious lack of democratic accountability – checks and balances – on, for 
instance, the respect of the principle of proportionality, the principle of transparency  as well as the 
protection of the human rights sphere remains within the regime. This lack of accountability needs to 
be tackled as soon as possible.  
Thus, in our view it is clear that the question  as to what extent an increase in  a security  rationale 
actually guarantees an increase  in internal safety and freedom leads to a negative answer. It seems that 
the quoted phrase “A world without frontiers in which solidarity with the whole human race dominates 
all intermediate solidarities remains a Utopian dream” is an unquestionable truth.
64 
 
 
                                                   
62 The European Commission has presented two proposals for Council  regulations: one of these is  on the 
establishment of a regime of local border traffic at the external borders of the member states and the other is on 
the establishment of a regime of local border traffic at the temporary land borders between  member  states, 
(12161/03, VISA 137, COMIX 518) Brussels, 2 September 2003.  See  also the  Communication on the Wider 
Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors, 11 March 
2003, COM(2003) 104 final. 
63 A very good compilation of these sorts of cases was carried out by the Euro Citizen Action Service (ECAS) 
hotline. The compilation provides a very useful tool to prove how Schengen works in practice and the gaps that 
still exist in its functioning. Further, some aspects of the regime are characterised by a lack of transparency and 
accountability. On 26 March 2000, the  fifth anniversary  after Schengen took effect ; a free phone number was 
advertised throughout Europe after a press conference to enable people (EU and non-EU nationals) to call the 
organisation to express their concerns. 
64 See Anderson (1996).  
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